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The valuation relevance of environmental performance revisited:  
The moderating role of environmental provisions 
 
Abstract 
This study attempts to broaden our understanding of the value relevance of environmental 
performance by providing empirical evidence on the moderating role of financial 
environmental reporting. Previous studies find that firms’ environmental performance can be 
both positively and negatively associated with market value. Such contradictory findings can 
be attributed to the fact that environmental performance is associated with future economic 
benefits and costs. This study suggests that firms with recognized environmental provisions 
on their balance sheets enable investors to disentangle these opposite effects either by 
signaling strong future financial performance or by enhancing the reliability of environmental 
performance information. Regardless of the mechanism by which this moderation effect is 
invoked, it is hypothesized that capital market participants place a positive and significantly 
higher value on the environmental performance ratings of firms with recognized 
environmental provisions than on the ratings of firms without environmental provisions. 
Utilizing a sample of 692 firm-year observations of French listed firms and employing a linear 
price-level model that associates the market value of a firm’s equity with its environmental 
performance, I provide empirical evidence to corroborate this thesis. In addition to 
contributing to the academic debate on the market valuation implications of environmental 
performance, this study intends to provide useful insights from a country that can be 
considered a pioneer of environmental reporting legislation; hence, it provides valuable 
lessons for other jurisdictions that are in the process of developing their sustainability 
reporting regulations. Finally, the findings of this study support the calls for more integrated 
reporting showing that the interaction of financial and non-financial information has market 
valuation implications. 
 
Keywords: Environmental performance; Environmental provisions; Value relevance; France; 
Mandatory disclosures 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Although a substantial number of studies have examined the relation between listed 
firms’ market value and environmental performance, the results to date are inconclusive. 
Studies such as Johnston, Sefcik, and Soderstrom (2008), Kaspereit and Lopatta (2016) and 
Middleton (2015) find a positive association between market value and environmental 
performance, whereas Moneva and Cuellar (2009), Hassel, Nilsson, and Nyquist (2005) and 
Johnston (2005) find a negative one. The mixed results of previous studies can be attributed 
to the fact that superior environmental performance is associated with both economic 
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benefits (Albertini, 2014; Koh, Qian, & Wang, 2014) and costs (Hassel et al., 2005; Jensen, 
2001; Kitzmueller & Shimshack, 2012), and consequently, investors may face difficulties in 
disentangling these opposite effects of environmental performance. In a recent article in the 
Wall Street Journal, Alex Edmans argues that “…investors have a particularly hard time 
valuing it [A/N: firms’ corporate social responsibility performance]. How do you measure the 
value of a company’s environmental stewardship? As a result, traditional investors mostly 
ignore companies’ social responsibility. They only catch on when its effects show up on the 
bottom line, for everyone to see” (Edmans & Vogel, 2016). The above observation not only 
confirms the contradictory empirical evidence of previous studies but also emphasizes the 
usefulness of quantifying firms’ environmental performance for valuation purposes in 
pecuniary terms. 
This study intends to broaden our understanding of this issue by focusing on the role of 
financial environmental reporting on the market valuation of environmental performance. 
The importance of measuring firms’ environmental impact in financial terms has been 
recently acknowledged not only by academics (for instance, Peloza, 2009) but also by 
practitioners and policy makers. In early 2016, the Financial Stability Board1 established the 
Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) with the aim of developing 
climate-related disclosures of a financial nature in order to encourage firms to align their 
disclosures with investors’ needs. In its final report of recommendations, TCFD emphasizes 
the importance of climate-related financial disclosures for investors and recommends that 
these disclosures be included in firms’ mainstream financial fillings (TCFD, 2017). Further, in 
2013, the Framework of the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC, 2013) was 
released. The Framework argues that the integration of financial and non-financial 
                                                 
1 The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is an international body that monitors and makes recommendations about 
the global financial system. The Board includes all G20 major economies and the European Commission. More 
information about FSB can be found at http://www.fsb.org/  
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information supports investors’ decision making and recognizes that financial information is 
the point of reference to which the other information shall be related (IIRC, 2013).  
My study posits that environmental reporting of financial nature – specifically 
environmental provisions – play a moderating role in the relationship between firms’ 
environmental performance and market value either by signaling strong future financial 
performance (Beaver, Eger, Ryan, & Wolfson, 1989; Lys, Naughton, & Wang, 2015; Wahlen, 
1994) or by enhancing the reliability of environmental performance information (Bae & Sami, 
2005; Campbell, Sefcik, & Soderstrom, 2003; Kennedy, Mitchell, & Sefcik, 1998). Regardless of 
the mechanism by which this moderation effect is invoked, my study suggests and empirically 
examines whether capital market participants place a positive and significantly higher value 
on the environmental performance ratings of firms with recognized environmental provisions 
than on the ratings of firms without environmental provisions. To do so, I utilize a sample of 
French listed firms for the ten-year period from 2005 to 2014 and employ a linear price-level 
model based on Ohlson’s (1995) valuation framework. This model associates a firm’s market 
value with its accounting information and ‘other information’, which, similar to previous 
studies (for instance, Hassel et al., 2005; Middleton, 2015), is proxied by firms’ environmental 
performance ratings. My study provides evidence that although the mean effect of 
environmental performance ratings on market value is negative, investors positively value the 
environmental performance of firms with environmental provisions recognized on their 
balance sheets. 
France is chosen as the empirical setting of this study for a number of reasons. France has 
been at the forefront of sustainability reporting since the 1970s, when the French President 
mandated all firms with more than 300 employees publish a report on their social 
performance (Wensen, Broer, Klein, & Knopf, 2011). In 2001, extensive mandatory 
sustainability reporting legislation was introduced. According to the then-new legislation, all 
listed firms were required to disclose nearly 60 indicators of sustainability activities in their 
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annual reports. Half of these indicators were related to environmental performance 
(Albertini, 2014). Amendments to this legislation were enacted in 2009 and 2010 with the 
Grenelle I and Grenelle II Acts, respectively, and took effect at the end of 2013 (KPMG, Centre 
for Corporate Governance in Africa, Global Reporting Initiative & United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2013). Its long history in mandatory sustainability reporting makes France the 
first country in the world in which such disclosures were mandated (Levy & Brown, 2012; 
Wensen et al., 2011). Even more importantly, France has one of the highest rankings among 
countries worldwide in terms of the number of firms that engage in sustainability reporting 
(KPMG, 2011, 2013, 2015). 
Moreover, France is an interesting laboratory for examining the valuation relevance of 
environmental performance in light of the recent developments in sustainability reporting in 
the European Union (EU) and its Non-Financial Reporting Directive 2014/95/EU (European 
Parliament and Council, 2014). According to the new Directive all large firms in the EU are 
required to provide information on their development, performance, position and impact of 
their activity on a number of matters; environmental ones included. This regulation has been 
effective since the beginning of 2017. Because French firms have had to comply with an 
extensive sustainability reporting regulatory framework much earlier than most of its 
European counterparts, “France is now a global leader in mandatory climate change related 
reporting and provides a model for other countries … It will be interesting to watch the 
influence of these initiatives over the coming year as more countries start to build climate 
disclosure into existing regulatory frameworks” (Asset Owners Disclosure Project [AODP], 
2017, p. 24). Finally, the focus on a setting in which environmental disclosures have been 
mandated since 2001 ensures a high degree of uniformity in firms’ reporting practices 
because firms must disclose both positive and negative aspects of their operations. 
Consequently, it can be expected that the market valuation of environmental performance is 
less distorted by differences in reporting incentives (Moneva & Cuellar, 2009). 
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This study contributes to the academic debate on the market valuation implications of 
environmental performance (Hassel et al., 2005; Johnston et al., 2008; Kaspereit & Lopatta, 
2016; Middleton, 2015; Moneva & Cuellar, 2009) and specifically addresses calls for research 
on variables that may have a moderating effect on the CSR performance – firm value relation 
(Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Although prior studies have shown that environmental liabilities 
are negatively related to firms’ market valuation (Barth & McNichols, 1994; Bewley, 2005) 
this study is the first to provide evidence on the moderating role of environmental liabilities. 
Further, the corporate world is moving towards more extensive mandatory disclosures on 
sustainability reporting (for instance, the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive). My study 
provides useful insights from a country that can be seen as a pioneer of environmental 
reporting legislation, and hence, it provides valuable experience for other jurisdictions that 
are in the process of developing their sustainability reporting regulations. Finally, the findings 
of my study support calls for more integrated reporting, showing that the interaction of 
financial and non-financial information has market valuation implications. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the prior literature and 
develops the sole hypothesis of the study. Section 3 illustrates the research design and the 
sample. Section 4 describes the basic univariate and multivariate analysis. Section 5 reports a 
battery of additional tests. Finally, Section 6 discusses the findings and draws conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
The market valuation of environmental performance has recently attracted a great deal of 
attention in the accounting literature. Although these studies acknowledge that 
environmental performance complements financial reporting for valuation purposes, they do 
not agree on the direction of this relationship. Whereas studies such as Johnston et al. (2008), 
Kaspereit and Lopatta (2016) and Middleton (2015) find that capital market participants 
positively value different proxies of environmental performance (such as listing status in 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
7 
 
sustainability indices, the magnitude of environmental performance metrics and emissions 
allowances held), studies such as Moneva and Cuellar (2009), Hassel et al. (2005) and 
Johnston (2005) find a negative association between market value and firms’ environmental 
performance proxies (such as expenditures on environmental activities and the magnitude of 
environmental performance metrics) . 
The mixed results of prior studies can be attributed to the fact that environmental 
performance is associated with economic benefits and costs. On one hand, firms that are 
found to perform well in terms of environmental issues can increase their competitive 
advantage (Albertini, 2014) and decrease their litigation risk (Koh et al., 2014), resulting in 
increased future cash flows and, thus, increased current market values. On the other hand, in 
their literature review, Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) conclude that social and 
environmental performance cannot be strongly associated either to higher profitability or to 
lower costs. Hassel et al. (2005) argue that strong environmental performance is related to 
increased costs and consequently to lower earnings and market values, and Jensen (2001) 
conjectures that a firm’s leadership in environmental or social issues can be interpreted by 
investors as managers’ intention to use a firm’s resources for their own interest (e.g., for 
building up their own reputation) and hence at the expense of shareholder value. Thus, the 
contradictory evidence from prior studies can be attributed to the difficulties faced by 
investors in disentangling future economic benefits and costs related to a firm’s 
environmental performance. 
According to Servaes and Tamayo (2013), in order “…to fully understand under which 
circumstances CSR [A/N corporate social responsibility and hence environmental] activities 
enhance firm value, we need to focus on the moderating effects of other variables on the CSR–
firm value relation” (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013 p. 1059). My study posits that environmental 
provisions recognized in a firm’s balance sheet can play such a moderating role.  
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According to the International Accounting Standard 37 (IAS 37) Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Contingent Assets2, a provision is a liability of an uncertain timing and/or 
amount. It is acknowledged that IAS 37 gives considerable discretion to a firm’s management 
of both the timing of recognition and the measurement of provisions (Schneider, 2011; 
Schneider, Michelon, & Maier, 2017). Further, as Schneider et al. (2017) note, unlike other 
financial liabilities, the economic effect of environmental provisions may hold even longer 
than the life of the firm that bears them. Environmental liabilities are associated with a firm’s 
assets in such a manner that even in case of a firm’s default, they remain connected to the 
assets reducing their future net cash flows (Schneider et al., 2017). This particular attribute of 
environmental provisions may discourage firms from recognizing such provisions when they 
have the discretion not to do so (Schneider et al., 2017) unless these firms are confident in 
their future financial strength (Beaver et al., 1989; Lys et al., 2015; Wahlen, 1994).  
Previous studies on bank loan loss provisions have shown that the recognition of 
provisions can be interpreted by investors as a signal of management’s private information 
about firms’ strong future financial performance (Beaver et al., 1989; Wahlen, 1994). As 
Beaver et al. (1989) argue, “…management perceives the earnings power…to be sufficiently 
strong that it can withstand a ‘hit to earnings’” (Beaver et al., 1989, p. 169). More recently, Lys 
et al. (2015) show that expenditures related to CSR activities does not have a direct causal 
effect on firms’ financial performance. This association does exist, but according to Lys et al. 
(2015), exceeding CSR expenditures is not found to create positive future cash flows but 
rather to play a signaling role regarding firms’ strong future financial performance. In other 
words, Lys et al. (2015) argue that firms will not undertake such a cost if they are not 
confident in their future financial strength. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that investors will 
                                                 
2 Specific reference to IAS 37 is made because my empirical setting focuses on a sample of firms that are 
mandated to apply International Financial Reporting Standards and hence IAS 37.  
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place a positive and significantly higher value on the environmental performance of firms that 
quantify their environmental impact in pecuniary terms compared to firms that do not do so.  
In addition to their potential signaling role, environmental provisions may also enhance 
the reliability of information about a firm’s environmental performance. Bae and Sami (2005) 
show that the reliability of a firm’s reporting is dependent on the presence of unbooked 
environmental liabilities, among other factors. Unbooked environmental liabilities add noise 
to a firm’s reported information and hence make it more difficult to estimate its future cash 
flows (Bae & Sami, 2005). In addition, it has been found that the disclosure of some form of 
financial information about a firm’s contingent environmental liabilities strengthens 
investors’ consensus on the amount of future cash outflows to be incurred (Kennedy et al., 
1998). Finally, Campbell et al. (2003) argue that a firm’s financial reporting may convey 
private information that has a moderating effect on the relation between unbooked 
environmental liabilities and market value. Specifically, they show that accounting 
information may reduce the uncertainty over a firm’s unbooked environmental liabilities and 
hence increase their market valuation (Campbell, et al., 2003). Based on previous studies 
about the market valuation implications of unbooked environmental liabilities and following 
Benlemlih, Shaukat, Qiu, and Trojanowski (2016), it can be argued that the recognition of 
environmental provisions may enhance the reliability and thus the market valuation of 
environmental performance. 
In summary, it can be argued that recognized environmental provisions play a moderating 
role in the relation between environmental performance and market value either by signaling 
strong future financial performance or by enhancing the reliability of environmental 
performance information. Regardless of the mechanism by which this moderation effect is 
invoked, it can be hypothesized that capital market participants place a positive and 
significantly higher value on the environmental performance ratings of firms with recognized 
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environmental provisions than on the ratings of firms without environmental provisions. 
Hence, this study tests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: The market valuation of environmental performance is positive and significantly 
higher for firms with recognized environmental provisions on their balance sheets than for 
firms without. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1 Main analysis 
This study aims to examine whether market participants value the environmental 
performance ratings of French listed firms with recognized environmental provisions 
differently than the performance ratings of French listed firms without recognized 
environmental provisions. Following previous studies on the value relevance of 
environmental performance (for instance, Hassel et al., 2005; Lourenço, Branco, Curto, & 
Eugénio, 2012), a linear price-level model that associates a firm’s market value of equity 
(MVE) with its book value of equity (BVE) and earnings (EARN) is employed: 
 
MVERS = αV + αXBVERS + αYEARNRS + εRS       
 
To address problems with heteroskedasticity and size effects, variables are deflated by the 
number of common shares outstanding six months after the end of the firm’s fiscal year 
(Dimitropoulos, Asteriou, Kousenidis, & Leventis, 2013; Lang, Raedy, & Wilson, 2006). 
According to Barth and Clinch (2009), the above model on a per-share basis produces more 
consistent and less biased estimations of coefficients’ p-values3: 
                                                 
3 All the variables, their definitions, and the sources from which the data are extracted are presented in Appendix 
A. 
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PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + εRS       
 
The above model is augmented by the variable ENVPERF, which is the total score of the 
Environmental Performance Pillar of the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. The ASSET4 
database collects information for up to 500 specific points related to a firm’s sustainability 
practices. Based on these data points, more than 180 key performance indicators are 
calculated and structured into 15 categories that fall into three pillars (environmental, social, 
and governance). All the information used is publicly available and quality controlled by 
experienced analysts (Thomson Reuters, 2015). The Environmental Performance Pillar 
measures a firm’s impact on the environment by evaluating how well the firm avoids 
environmental risks and capitalizes on environmental opportunities on a percentage scale. A 
relatively higher score indicates a better environmental performance. 
Additionally, prior literature has shown that earnings of loss-making firms are valued 
differently than earnings of profit-making firms. Specifically, Collins Pincus, and Xie (1999) 
employ a model similar to my model and show that the earnings coefficient of profit-making 
firms is significantly larger than that of loss-making firms. More recently, Venter, Emanuel, 
and Cahan (2014) find that the earnings of profit-making firms are positively associated with 
market prices, whereas the price-earnings relation of loss-making firms is not statistically 
significant. Hence, in order to control for differences in the earnings coefficients of loss- and 
profit-making firms, the binary variable LOSS, which equals one if earnings are negative and 
zero otherwise, is included in the model and further allowed to interact with EPS (Coulmont & 
Berthelot, 2015; Xu, Magnan, & Andre, 2007). 
Since the analysis is based on firms that belong to different industries and spans several 
years, the multiple dummy variables IND and YR that control for industry and year fixed 
effects, respectively, are also included in the model (Matsumura, Prakash, & Vera-Muñoz, 
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2014). IND is derived from nine out of the ten industries4 of the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB), whereas YR is derived from the ten years (i.e., 2005-2014) included in the 
analysis. Thus, the final form of the model is as follows: 
 
PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^LOSSRS + α_(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αaENVPERFRS + ∑ αcdINDRS 
efg
dfX +
∑ αhiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS                     (1) 
 
The focus of Model 1 is on coefficient α3, which reflects the market valuation of 
environmental performance. If the coefficient α3 is found to be significantly different from 
zero, it can be postulated that environmental performance is value relevant. Because the 
variable ENVPERF is measured on a percentage basis in which higher ratings indicate better 
performance, a positive and statistically significant coefficient indicates that investors view 
high ratings of environmental performance as reflecting future economic benefits, whereas a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient indicates future economic costs. However, if 
the coefficient α3 is not found to be statistically significant, then it can be claimed that on 
average, either capital market participants do not find any benefits/costs related to French 
listed firms’ environmental performance rating or the benefits and costs ‘cancel’ each other 
out, and thus, the resulting coefficient is not different from zero. 
To test the hypothesis of this study, Model 1 discussed above is employed by pooling 
observations from the entire sample (as described in the next section) and introducing the 
indicator variable ENVPROVD, which equals one if a firm has recognized environmental 
provisions on its balance sheet and zero otherwise. To investigate whether there is a 
systematic difference in the valuation of ENVPERF between firms with and without 
recognized environmental provisions, I allow the ENVPROVD variable to interact with 
ENVPERF. The final model for testing my main hypothesis is as follows: 
                                                 
4 As discussed in section 3.2, firms that belong to the Financials ICB industry are excluded from the sample. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
13 
 
 
PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^LOSSRS + α_(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αaENVPERFRS + αcENVPROVDRS +
αh(ENVPERFRS × ENVPROVDRS) + ∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS           (2) 
 
The focus of Model 2 is the coefficient α7: If this coefficient is found to be positive and 
significantly different from zero, it can be postulated that the environmental performance 
ratings of firms with recognized environmental provisions on their balance sheets are valued 
higher than firms without these provisions. If the coefficient is not found to be significantly 
different from zero, then it can be concluded that the recognition of environmental provisions 
has no effect on the market valuation of environmental performance ratings. Finally, in all 
estimations standard errors are two-way clustered (by firm and year)5. 
Finally, with respect to the data sources utilized in this study, all accounting and market 
data are retrieved from the Thomson Reuters Datastream, whereas environmental data are 
retrieved from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. Details about data sources are given in 
the Appendix.  
 
3.2 Sample 
The sample is based on French listed firms with available data on environmental 
performance and environmental provisions in the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database for the 
                                                 
5 Clustering on two dimensions was chosen over a fixed effects approach for a number of reasons. First, 
employing fixed firm effects assumes that these effects are indeed fixed throughout time. However, this 
assumption does not always hold empirically, and it is not always possible to identify whether firm effects are 
permanent or temporary (Petersen, 2009). According to Petersen (2009), standard errors clustered on multiple 
dimensions are unbiased regardless of whether the firm effects are permanent or temporary. Second, similar to 
Oikonomou, Brooks, and Pavelin (2014), my model includes time-invariant variables (such as the indicator 
variable ENVPROVD in the cases where a firm has recognized environmental provisions in all or none of the 
examined years) that cannot be included directly in the model if fixed effects are employed since their effects will 
be captured by the intercept (Oikonomou et al., 2014). Third, the environmental performance variable ENVPERF 
varies largely cross-sectionally and less over time [its average standard deviation by year is 2.5 times higher than 
its average standard deviation by firm (0.22 and 0.09, respectively)]. Consequently, fixed effects estimators may 
not detect an effect of this variable on the dependent variable even if one exists (Zhou, 2001). Lastly, it should be 
noted that similar (untabulated) results are found when the model is estimated with two-way (firm-year) 
clustered standard errors without controlling for year fixed effects and; with standard errors clustered only by 
firm and controlling for year fixed effects. 
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ten-year period from 2005 to 2014. I refrain from using data from earlier years because the 
mandatory introduction of the International Financial Reporting Standards occurred in 2005. 
In this case, I ensure that the environmental provisions of all firms and years are recognized 
under the same accounting standard (i.e., IAS 37). The number of firms covered by ASSET4 
during this decade does not vary substantially: from a minimum of 72 firms found to have 
available environmental performance and environmental provisions data in 2005 to a 
maximum of 95 in 2012 and 2013. From a total of 868 firm-year observations, 129 
observations of firms from the financial industry (ICB code 8000) are excluded because of the 
particularities of the assets and liabilities of this industry that might affect the relationship 
between accounting numbers and market value (Clacher, de Ricquebourg, & Hodgson, 2013; 
Dahmash, Durand, & Watson, 2009); 18 observations are withdrawn because of a negative 
book value of equity, which may reduce the inferential quality (Ahmed, Morton, & Schaefer, 
2000) and increase the noise (Bugeja and Gallery, 2006) of my empirical tests; one 
observation is excluded because of a lack of earnings data availability. Finally, 28 observations 
are identified by Cook’s distance statistic6 as highly influential and are eliminated. The final 
sample is composed of 692 firm-year observations, of which 481 do not have environmental 
provisions recognized on their balance sheets and 211 include such provisions (Table 1).  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 breaks the total number of firm/year observations and unique firms down by 
industry and by group (with and without environmental provisions). Almost 40% of the 
observations with environmental provisions (83 out of the 211) are from the Industrials 
sector. In contrast, industries that can be considered as less energy-intensive, such as 
Consumer Services and Technology (Lund, 2007), are under-represented. Further, it should 
                                                 
6 Observations with Cook’s distance higher than 4/n, where n is the number of observations, are excluded. 
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be noted that although the total number of firms in the sample is 81, the 28 of them appear in 
both subsamples in Table 2 since they are found to have recognized environmental provisions 
on their balance sheets at least in one year but not in all years under examination7. As a final 
remark, it is worth stressing that although the number of firms covered by ASSET4 is 
relatively small, it corresponds to more than 80% of the total capitalization of the French 
capital market. Specifically, on aggregate, the 692 firm/year observations of my sample 
correspond to the 81.5% of the total market capitalization for the decade under examination8 
(untabulated).  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
4. Findings 
4.1 Data description and univariate analysis 
Table 3 provides basic summary statistics of the variables utilized in the multivariate 
analysis separately for the full sample and subsamples of firms with and without recognized 
environmental provisions. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The average firm of the full sample has a share price of €44.98, a book value of equity per 
share of €22.94, and earnings per share of €4.41. Taking a closer look at the subsample of 
firms with environmental provisions, the average firm has environmental provisions per 
share of €1.13, and interestingly, it has significantly higher environmental performance 
                                                 
7 On average, these firms have recognized environmental provisions in almost 5 (specifically 4.86) annual 
accounting periods. 
8 On an annual basis, this ratio varies from a minimum of 72.4% in 2005 to a maximum of 88.9% in 2012 
(untabulated). 
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ratings than the average firm that has no environmental provisions. Specifically, the mean 
ENVPERF of the subsample with recognized environmental provisions is 0.89, whereas the 
one without environmental provisions is 0.73.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Furthermore, Figure 1 provides annual mean scores of environmental provisions per 
share for the subsample with recognized provisions. As it can be seen, although there is some 
variation among years, a substantial amount of environmental provisions is recognized in all 
10 years. Additionally, there is a large difference in the number of firms that have 
environmental provisions recognized on their balance sheets; fewer firms in earlier years 
than more recently. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 reports Pearson’s correlation coefficients for all variables used in the main 
analysis. Consistent with previous studies that employ a similar model, correlation 
coefficients between PR, BVS and EPS are positive and statistically significant, indicating a 
positive relationship between firms’ basic accounting information and their market value. In 
addition, as is also expected, the variable LOSS is found to be significantly and negatively 
correlated to PR. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient between PR and ENVPROVS is found 
to be negative and significant, which is an initial indication that environmental provisions 
depict future cash outflows for a firm and hence, as expected, they are negatively priced by 
capital market participants. Finally, the main variable of interest (ENVPERF) is found to be 
negatively but not significantly correlated to PR. This finding can be seen as a preliminary 
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indication that the environmental performance rating of the average French listed firm is not 
related to the firm’s market valuation. 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
The results of the main multivariate analysis are presented in Table 5. Although the main 
model of interest is Model 2, a basic model without environment-related variables and two 
different specifications of Model 1 are estimated. The first specification of Model 1 is 
estimated as described in section 3.1, whereas the second specification is estimated by 
replacing the ENVPERF variable with the binary ENVPROVD variable, which indicates 
whether a firm has recognized environmental provisions on its balance sheets9. A general 
comment that can be made is that in all four models, the coefficients of the basic summary 
accounting-information variables of BVS and EPS are positive and highly significant. This 
finding indicates that both the book value of equity and earnings have an impact on the 
market valuation of French listed firms during the first decade of IFRS implementation (i.e., 
2005-2014). Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients of BVS and EPS are similar to 
previous studies on the value relevance of the book value of equity and earnings in France 
(Devalle, Onali, & Magarini, 2010). Another interesting and expected finding is that the 
earnings valuation coefficient of loss-making firms significantly differs from that of profit-
making firms (Collins et al., 1999; Venter et al., 2014), as evidenced primarily by the 
coefficient of the interaction variable EPSxLOSS, which is found to be negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level in all four specifications. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
                                                 
9 In Table 5, this model is indicated as Model 1b. 
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Regarding Model 1, the estimated coefficient of the main variable of interest (ENVPERF) is 
found to be negative (-16.571) and statistically significant (at the 10% level). This finding 
suggests that on average, French listed firms’ environmental performance ratings are 
negatively related to their market valuation. Further, in the second specification of Model 1 
(i.e., Model 1b), the ENVPERF variable is replaced by the ENVPROVD variable. The results 
reveal a strong negative association between market valuation and the recognition of 
environmental provisions (-14.431 at 1% level). This finding indicates that, ceteris paribus, 
firms with environmental provisions recognized on their balance sheets are valued at €14.4 
less on average than firms without environmental provisions. 
More, the estimated coefficients of Model 2, in which the binary variable ENVPROVD and 
the interaction term ENVPERFxENVPROD are incorporated, unveil a systematic difference 
between firms with recognized environmental provisions on their balance sheets compared to 
firms without environmental provisions. The coefficient of ENVPROVD is found to be negative 
(-37.457) and statistically significant (at the 1% level). In addition, the main effect of 
environmental performance (that is, ENVPERF) remains negative but is not statistically 
significant (-12.591). Finally, the interaction effect ENVPERFxENVPROD is found to be 
positive and statistically significant at the 10% level (27.646). 
 
5. Additional analyses 
Aside from the primary research design discussed before, several additional tests are 
performed to examine the sensitivity of my results. First, I employ a series of propensity 
score-matching methods to match the 211 observations found to have recognized 
environmental provisions to observations without recognized environmental provisions. In 
addition, I correct for potential sample selection bias. Finally, I estimate a battery of different 
specifications to further ensure the robustness of my results. 
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5.1 Matched samples 
In the main analysis, my examination is based on the total number of firm/year 
observations with available environmental performance and environmental provision data in 
the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. The full sample of 692 observations is divided into 
two subgroups based on whether a firm has recognized environmental provisions on its 
balance sheet. Nevertheless, this approach might suffer from sample selection bias and thus 
from biased parameter estimates (Armstrong, Jagolinzer, & Larcker, 2010). To rule out the 
possibility that my results are driven by differences in firms’ characteristics between the two 
subgroups, I employ a propensity score matching approach (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 
1985) to match the subgroup of firms with environmental provisions with a subgroup of firms 
that have a number of similar characteristics but do not recognize environmental provisions 
on their balance sheets. To implement this approach, I first employ a probit model in which I 
regress the binary variable ENVPROVD on a number of firm-level variables (Benlemlih & 
Bitar, 2015; Hooghiemstra, Kuang, & Qin, 2015), such as SIZE for size effects, LEV for leverage, 
TOBINQ for growth opportunities (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011), BM for risk (Fama & 
French, 1992), ROE for profitability, ETS for participation to an emissions-trading scheme 
(Luo, Lan, & Tang, 2012) and SUSTREP for sustainability reporting (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). 
Finally, the matching process is controlled for industry and year (Table 6, Panel A).  
Based on this model, I derive the propensity scores of each observation, and I use four 
alternative methods to match the 211 observations that are found to have recognized 
environmental provisions (i.e., ENVPROVD=1) to observations that do not have recognized 
environmental provisions (i.e., ENVPROVD=0). First, I employ a one-to-one nearest-neighbor 
matching without replacement in which each observation of the ‘treated’ group (i.e., 
ENVPROVD=1) is matched with one unique observation of the ‘untreated’ group that is found 
to have the lowest distance in their propensity scores. Second, according to Stuart (2010), the 
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method of k:1 matching without any restrictions may lead to poor matches if no observations 
of the ‘untreated’ group have propensity scores similar to those of the observations of the 
‘treated’ group. To avoid such poor matches, the literature suggests the use of a caliper that 
would determine the maximum distance within which a match can be found (Stuart, 2010). In 
order to adequately address this potential problem of a poor match, I match my sample based 
on a caliper size of 0.05. In addition, I recalculate the propensity scores by employing a 
reduced version of the PSM probit model discussed above, which is based on the variables 
found to be statistically significant in the initial estimation of the model (Table 6, Panel A). 
Employing the same two matching methods discussed above (i.e., one-to-one nearest-
neighbor and caliper size of 0.05), I derive two additional alternative matched samples.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6, Panel B reports the specifications of odel 2 based on the four matched samples 
discussed above and on the full unmatched sample. The results of all specifications are similar 
to the main analysis. It is indicative that the interaction term ENVPERFxENVPROD is not only 
positive and statistically significant but its relation with PR is also stronger (significant at the 
5% level). 
 
5.2 Heckman sample selection correction 
Another potential problem of the sample is that it may not be random due to the 
(unknown to the public) procedure that ASSET4 follows in order to decide on covering a firm 
(El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kim, 2017). If this is the case, then my sample is plagued by sample 
selection bias. In order to eliminate such concerns, I follow Matsumura et al. (2014) and use 
Heckman’s (1979) full maximum likelihood method to correct for potential sample selection 
bias by jointly estimating the valuation and selection models (Table 7). Similar to El Ghoul et 
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al. (2017), the selection model is a probit model in which the dependent variable is the binary 
variable ASSET4, which equals one if a firm is covered by ASSET4 analysts and zero 
otherwise. The ASSET4 binary variable is regressed on a number of firm-level variables (SIZE, 
LEV, TOBINQ, BM and, ROE). The estimation of this model is performed based on a sample 
that derives from merging my main sample from ASSET4 (692 observations) with the total of 
French listed firms found in Datastream (7,133 observations). After excluding firms from the 
financial industry (1,187 observations), observations with a negative book value of equity 
(315 observations) and observations with missing values (359 observations), the final sample 
for the Heckman test is 5,964 firm/year observations. Table 7 reports the estimations of both 
the valuation and selection models. The results corroborate the initial findings: the interaction 
effect ENVPERFxENVPROD is found to be positive and statistically significant at the 10% level 
(25.509). 
 
 [Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
5.3 Other specifications 
A battery of additional specifications is estimated in order to further ensure the 
robustness of my results. Table 8 reports estimated coefficients for seven models [(Models (i) 
to (vii)]. The results in all these models are in line with the initial analysis. 
First, it has been shown that loss-making firms are priced differently than profit-making 
firms by capital markets (Collins et al., 1999; Venter et al., 2014). Although the inclusion of the 
binary variable LOSS and the interaction term LOSSxEPS in Model 2 are expected to control 
for this difference, I re-estimate the model based on a sample that includes only profit-making 
firms (641 firm/year observations). 
Second, ASSET4 Environmental Performance ratings are used in this study as the main 
proxy of firms’ impact on the environment. Despite its merits, a potential drawback of this 
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performance measurement is that it considers a firm’s recognized environmental provisions, 
which, in turn, are related to the independent variable ENVPROVD, which indicates whether a 
firm has recognized environmental provisions on its balance sheet. Although environmental 
provisions are only one out of the almost 180 data points used for calculating Environmental 
Performance and even though the untabulated univariate analysis reveals a relatively low 
correlation between ENVPERF and ENVPROVD (0.32), an alternative proxy for environmental 
performance ratings is used in order to ensure that my results are not driven by the 
underlying relationship between ENVPERF and ENVPROVD. The alternative proxy for 
ENVPERF is constructed by removing the common variation between the two variables. For 
this, the ENVPERF variable is regressed on the ENVPROVD variable, and the residuals are 
used as the alternative proxy of environmental performance. 
Third, in order to mitigate concerns related to reverse causality between market values 
and environmental provisions, Model 2 is re-estimated with all independent variables being 
one-period lagged (Chang, Kim, & Li, 2014; Oikonomou et al., 2014; Oikonomou, Brooks, & 
Pavelin, 2012). Due to the use of lagged variables, the sample is shrunk into 601 firm/year 
observations.  
Fourth, an augmented version of Model 2 is estimated [Model (iv)] in which a number of 
control variables that may have an impact on a firm’s market valuation are included. First, 
Berk (1995) indicates that firms with greater assets tend to have higher market value. To 
control for size effects, variables are deflated by the number of common shares outstanding. 
As a second control for size effects, the variable SIZE, which is computed as the natural 
logarithm of total assets, is included in the model. Second, the variable LEV denotes a firm’s 
leverage and is computed as the total liabilities divided by the book value of equity. Third, the 
variable BM is the book value to market value of equity. Fama and French (1992) show that 
the book to market value explains a large amount of stock return variation; thus, it is a good 
proxy for risk. Finally, the binary variable ETS equals one if the firm’s emissions are traded in 
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an emissions trading scheme and zero otherwise (Chapple, Clarkson, & Gold, 2013), and the 
binary variable SUSTREP equals one if the firm publishes a stand-alone sustainability report 
in the current year and zero otherwise (Dhaliwal et al., 2011) 
Fifth, I examine the effect of the levels of environmental provisions on the market 
valuation of environmental performance ratings. Based on the main analysis, the valuation 
coefficient of environmental performance is expected to significantly differ between firms 
with and without recognized environmental provisions. If the recognition of probable future 
environmental liabilities indeed enables investors to disentangle the economic benefits and 
costs related to a firm’s environmental performance, then it is reasonable to expect the level 
of environmental provisions to have a moderating effect on the relationship between 
environmental performance ratings and market values. If such an effect is found, then I can 
conclude with greater certainty that environmental provisions play a role in the market 
valuation implications of environmental performance ratings. To examine whether such a 
moderating effect exists, I focus on the subsample of 211 observations with recognized 
environmental provisions and further develop the basic model by decomposing BVS across 
the book value of equity, excluding the environmental provisions per share (BV_ENVPROVS) 
and the book value of environmental provisions per share (ENVPROVS). It should be noted 
that because environmental provisions are a liability, to exclude the recognized amount of 
environmental provisions from the total book value of equity, the former is added to the latter 
accounting item. Finally, the moderating effect of environmental provisions on the market 
valuation of environmental performance ratings is tested by including the interaction variable 
ENVPERFxENVPROVS [Model (v)]. Utilizing the subgroup of 211 firm-year observations that 
are found to have recognized environmental provisions, the regression results confirm the 
findings of my main analysis, in which investors positively value the environmental 
performance ratings of firms with recognized environmental provisions. Specifically, the 
coefficient of ENVPERF is found to be positive (11.480) and statistically insignificant. Further, 
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a significant moderation effect of the levels of environmental provisions on the market 
valuation of environmental performance is found. Specifically, the coefficient of the 
interaction effect is found to be positive (17.813) and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Furthermore – and as expected – the main effect of environmental provisions (ENVPROV) is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. The above findings reveal an economically significant 
relationship. Specifically, it is shown that for every one Euro of recognized environmental 
provisions, an increase of environmental performance by 1% has a positive impact of 0.18 
Euros on firms’ market valuation. Further, it is revealed that for any given level of 
environmental provision, environmental performance is valued positively by investors only 
for firms with environmental performance higher than the mean of the sample (that is, 0.89). 
Thus, it can be surmised with even greater certainty that environmental provisions 
recognized by French listed firms have a moderating effect on the market valuation of firms’ 
environmental performance ratings. 
Finally, in order to test whether my results are sensitive to the model employed, I 
estimate two alternative models. The first one [Model (vi)] is the balance sheet valuation 
model (Barth & McNichols, 1994; Campbell et al., 2003; Matsumura et al., 2014), which relates 
share prices (PR) to total assets per share (TAS), total liabilities per share (TLS) and earnings 
per share (EPS). The second model [Model (vii)] is inspired by El Ghoul et al. (2017) and 
Servaes and Tamayo (2013) and relates Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ) to Environmental Performance 
(ENVPERF) after controlling for a number of firm-level characteristics (SIZE, ROE, LEV, BM, 
ETS, SUSTREP). 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
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6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
The purpose of this study is to provide insights on the moderating role of environmental 
provisions in the market valuation of environmental performance. Utilizing a sample of 
French listed firms for the ten-year period from 2005 to 2014, I find that although the mean 
effect of environmental performance ratings on market value is negative, investors positively 
value the environmental performance of firms with environmental provisions recognized on 
their balance sheets. My findings hold for a battery of different model specifications and 
robustness tests. Regarding the first finding, my study provides evidence of a negative relation 
between environmental performance ratings and market value. This negative relation may be 
indicative of investors perceiving strong environmental performance as costly and hence 
having negative effects on future earnings (Hassel et al., 2005) or as an attempt by firm 
managers to use a firm’s resources for their own interests and hence at the expense of 
shareholders value (Jensen, 2001).  
Nevertheless, this negative relation, albeit statistically significant, is found to be relatively 
weak. This weak relation may suggest that two opposite effects on the market valuation of 
environmental performance ‘cancel’ each other out: a positive effect that depicts future 
economic benefits (Albertini, 2014; Koh et al., 2014) and a negative effect that depicts future 
costs (Hassel et al., 2005; Jensen, 2001; Kitzmueller & Shimshack, 2012). My study posits that 
environmental provisions enable investors to disentangle future economic benefits and costs 
related to a firm’s environmental performance either by signaling strong future financial 
performance (Beaver et al., 1989; Lys et al., 2015; Wahlen, 1994) or by enhancing the 
reliability of environmental performance information (Bae & Sami, 2005; Campbell et al., 
2003; Kennedy et al., 1998). My study’s main finding supports this position by showing that 
capital market participants positively value the environmental performance of firms with 
environmental provisions recognized on their balance sheets. This finding is also in line with 
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Campbell et al. (2003), who show that environment-related accounting information has a 
moderating effect on the market valuation of environmental information.  
Furthermore, this study provides evidence on the moderating effect of levels of 
environmental provisions on the market valuation of environmental performance. 
Specifically, I show that for any given level of environmental performance, as the magnitude of 
the environmental provisions recognized on a firm’s balance sheet increases, the positive 
effect of environmental performance on the firm’s market valuation increases. This finding 
further supports my position that the recognition of future environmental liabilities enables 
investors to disentangle the economic costs and benefits associated with a firm’s 
environmental performance. My findings show not only statistical but also economic 
significance. 
Finally, it should be stressed that my study does not examine whether strong 
environmental performance drives firms to recognize environmental provisions or vice versa. 
Its intention is to examine whether environmental provisions play a moderating role in the 
relation between a firm’s environmental performance and market value. Although the 
mechanism of this effect is not explored in depth in this study, it is suggested that investors 
can better disentangle the costs and benefits related to a firm’s environmental performance if 
the firm recognizes environmental provisions on its balance sheet. 
To conclude, the following remarks can be made. First, although we have recently 
witnessed numerous initiatives in socially responsible investing activities – which focus on 
firms’ social and environmental impact – the evidence found in this study suggests that 
environmental reporting of a financial nature still plays a prominent role in investors’ 
decision making. Recent developments in environmental reporting, such as the TCFD 
endeavor, which aims at developing climate-related disclosures of a financial nature, further 
support this argument. Second, the significant interaction effect of the two main variables of 
interest of this study emphasizes the interrelatedness between financial and non-financial 
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information for valuation purposes. This finding corroborates the recent developments in 
integrated reporting, which argues that the integration of financial and non-financial 
information supports investors’ decision making. Finally, the fact that financial environmental 
reporting is found to play a significant moderating role in the market valuation of 
environmental performance in a country characterized as the leader in mandatory 
environmental reporting worldwide (AODP, 2017; KPMG, 2015) underlines the importance of 
financial environmental reporting, especially in jurisdictions with few or no regulations on 
sustainability reporting. In such jurisdictions, investors are expected to face even greater 
difficulties in disentangling the costs and benefits related to environmental performance, thus 
making the disclosure of financial environmental information even more necessary. Future 
research can examine this issue. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Sample selection process 
  Firm/Year obs. 
Initial number of observations with environmental performance data found in Asset4 for the 
period 2005-2014  
  868   
less  observations from Financials industry (ICB code 8000)   -129   
less  observations with negative book value of equity   -18   
less observations with no earnings data   -1   
less  highly influential observations identified by Cook’s distance* statistic   -28   
Final sample   692   
                        without recognized environmental provisions   481  
                        with recognized environmental provisions  211  
*Observations with Cook’s distance higher than 4/n, where n is the number of observations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Observations and unique firms by industry  
 
Without Environmental 
Provisions 
 
With Environmental 
Provisions 
Industry Firm/Year Obs Unique firms Firm/Year Obs Unique firms 
Basic Materials 14 3 16 3 
Consumer Goods 81 14 40 9 
Consumer Services 132 15 3 2 
Health Care 24 4 12 2 
Industrials 116 18 83 12 
Oil & Gas 36 5 9 2 
Technology 65 8 3 1 
Telecommunication 2 1 8 1 
Utilities 11 4 37 5 
Total 481 72 
 
211            37 
The total number of unique firms in the sample is 81: 44 of them do not have recognized environmental provisions 
in any of the years under examination; 28 of them have recognized environmental provisions at least in one year but 
not in all years and; 9 of them have recognized environmental provisions in all years.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
  Full sample 
 
With Environmental 
Provisions  
Without Environmental 
Provisions   
  Mean Median S.D. 
 
Mean Median S.D. 
 
Mean Median S.D. 
 
(N=692) 
 
(N=211) 
 
(N=481)   
PR 44.98 37.36 34.24 
 
42.48 37.77 31.23 
 
46.07 37.29 35.45 
 
BVS 22.94 19.31 16.77 
 
28.43 27.21 17.53 
 
20.53 17.21 15.86 
 
EPS 4.41 3.85 4.25 
 
4.92 4.36 4.69 
 
4.18 3.59 4.02 
 
LOSS 0.07 0.00 0.26  0.08 0.00 0.27  0.07 0.00 0.26  
ENVPERF 0.78 0.89 0.22 
 
0.89 0.92 0.09 
 
0.73 0.84 0.25 
 
ENVPROVS 0.34 0.00 1.87  1.13 0.16 3.25  - - -  
ENVPROV_BV 0.02 0.00 0.12  0.06 0.01 0.21  - - -  
ENVPROV_MV 0.04 0.00 0.44  0.12 0.01 0.80  - - -  
PR is the market value of equity six months after fiscal year-end scaled by the number of common shares; BVS is the book 
value of equity scaled by the number of common shares; EPS is the earnings before interest and taxation scaled by the 
number of common shares; LOSS is a binary variable which equals one if EPS is negative and zero otherwise; ENVPERF is 
the environmental performance pillar of ASSET4 (on a % scale) as measured by ASSET4 analysts; ENVPROVS is the 
environmental provisions recognized in a firm's balance sheet scaled by the number of common shares; ENVPROV_BV is the 
environmental provisions recognized in a firm's balance sheet scaled by book value of equity; ENVPROV_MV is the 
environmental provisions recognized in a firm's balance sheet scaled by market value of equity. 
Figures in bold indicate statistically significant difference between the ‘without’ and the ‘with’ recognized environmental 
provisions samples at least at 5% level: T-test for mean and Wilcoxon test for median differences are applied respectively 
  
Figure 1. Mean Environmental Provisions by year  
 
 
 
Table 4. Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the full sample 
  PR BVS EPS ENVPERF ENVPROVS ENVPROVD 
BVS 0.63* 
   
  
EPS 0.69* 0.61* 
  
  
ENVPERF -0.02 0.12* 0.04 
 
  
ENVPROVS -0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.10*   
ENVPROVD -0.05 0.22* 0.08* 0.32* 0.28*  
LOSS -0.23* -0.09* -0.42* 0.09* 0.10* 0.02 
PR is the market value of equity six months after fiscal year-end scaled by the number of common shares; BVS is the book 
value of equity scaled by the number of common shares; EPS is the earnings before interest and taxation scaled by the 
number of common shares; ENVPERF is the environmental performance pillar of ASSET4 (on a % scale) as measured by 
ASSET4 analysts; ENVPROVS is the environmental provisions recognized in a firm's balance sheet scaled by the number of 
common shares; ENVPROVD is a binary variable which equals one if a firm has recognized environmental provisions in its 
balance sheet in the current year and zero otherwise; LOSS is a binary variable which equals one if EPS is negative and zero 
otherwise. 
* indicates significant correlation at least at 5% level 
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Table 5. Regressions results – full sample 
Model 1 PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^LOSSRS + α_(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αaENVPERFRS + ∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
Model 1b PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^LOSSRS + α_(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αaENVPROVDRS + ∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
Model 2 PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^LOSSRS + α_(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αaENVPERFRS + αcENVPROVDRS + αh(ENVPERFRS ×
ENVPROVDRS) + ∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
Variables Basic model Model 1 Model 1b Model 2 
Constant 32.250*** 44.137*** 33.004*** 42.077*** 
 (6.224) (8.247) (5.814) (8.026) 
     
BVS 0.573*** 0.587*** 0.660*** 0.663*** 
 (0.196) (0.192) (0.184) (0.185) 
     
EPS 4.042*** 4.066*** 3.997*** 3.989*** 
 (1.002) (0.992) (0.988) (0.987) 
     
LOSS -4.082 -2.266 -3.222 -2.287 
 (4.437) (4.164) (4.060) (3.902) 
     
LOSSxEPS -2.684* -2.665* -2.799* -2.673* 
 (1.561) (1.537) (1.604) (1.554) 
     
ENVPERF  -16.571*  -12.591 
  (8.761)  (8.101) 
     
ENVPROVD   -14.431*** -37.457*** 
   (3.529) (11.880) 
     
ENVPERFxENVPROVD    27.646* 
    (14.338) 
     
Industry effects yes yes yes yes 
Year effects yes yes yes yes 
     
N (firm/year) 692 692 692 692 
Adj. R2 0.646 0.656 0.672 0.678 
PR (dependent variable in all specifications) is the market value of equity six months after fiscal year-end scaled by the 
number of common shares; BVS is the book value of equity scaled by the number of common shares; EPS is the earnings 
before interest and taxation scaled by the number of common shares; LOSS is a binary variable which equals one if EPS is 
negative and zero otherwise; ENVPERF is the environmental performance pillar of ASSET4 (on a % scale) as measured by 
ASSET4 analysts; ENVPROVD is a binary variable which equals one if a firm has recognized environmental provisions in its 
balance sheet in the current year and zero otherwise. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Two-way clustered (by firm and year) standard errors (in parentheses) 
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Table 6. Additional analysis 1: Alternative matched samples based on PSM 
Panel A. Estimation of propensity score functions 
Probit Model ENVPROVDRS = αV + αXSIZERS + αYLEVRS + α^TOBINQRS + α_BMRS + αaROERS + αcETSRS + αhSUSTREPRS +
∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS   
Variables  Full model SE Reduced model SE 
Constant  -3.200*** (1.165) -4.243*** (1.022) 
SIZE  0.205*** (0.070) 0.260*** (0.060) 
LEV  -0.111*** (0.042) -0.093** (0.039) 
TOBINQ   -1.416*** (0.222) -1.299*** (0.190) 
BM  -0.066 (0.070)   
ROE   0.323 (0.483)   
ETS  0.261 (0.171)   
SUSTREP  -0.002 (0.247)   
      
Industry effects  yes yes 
Year effects  yes yes 
N(firm/year)  692 692 
Pseudo. R2  0.399 0.395 
ENVPROVD (dependent variable) is a binary variable which equals one if the firm has recognized environmental provisions in 
its balance sheet in the current year and zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is a leverage ratio 
computed as total liabilities divided by book value of equity; TOBINQ is computed as market value of equity divided by total 
assets; BM is book-to-market ratio computed as book value of equity to market value of equity; ROE is return on equity ratio 
computed as earnings before interest and taxation to book value of equity; ETS is a binary variable which equals one if the 
firm’s emissions are traded in an emissions trading scheme and zero otherwise; SUSTREP is a binary variable which equals 
one if the firm publishes a stand-alone sustainability report in the current year and zero otherwise. 
 
Panel B. Specifications based on alternative matching methods  
Valuation model PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^LOSSRS + α_(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αaENVPERFRS + αcENVPROVDRS +
αh(ENVPERFRS × ENVPROVDRS) + ∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
Variables 
Unmatched 
sample 
Full model  Reduced model 
1-to-1 without 
replacement 
Caliper 0.05 
1-to-1 without 
replacement 
Caliper 0.05 
Constant 42.077*** 30.107** 28.860* 28.045** 30.373* 
 (8.026) (13.932) (16.801) (12.932) (16.165) 
      
BVS 0.663*** 0.628*** 0.660*** 0.642*** 0.700*** 
 (0.185) (0.197) (0.224) (0.191) (0.204) 
      
EPS 3.989*** 3.948*** 3.783*** 3.883*** 3.696*** 
 (0.987) (1.012) (1.087) (0.972) (1.015) 
      
LOSS -2.287 1.139 5.551 1.525 -2.980 
 (3.902) (4.095) (6.599) (4.031) (3.824) 
      
LOSSxEPS -2.673* -2.478* -1.551 -2.214 -1.829 
 (1.554) (1.490) (1.448) (1.367) (1.502) 
      
ENVPERF -12.591 -11.855 -15.675 -7.922 -13.164 
 (8.101) (16.353) (18.111) (14.854) (18.125) 
      
ENVPROVD -37.457*** -37.441*** -40.830** -34.583*** -41.999** 
 (11.880) (13.723) (17.151) (11.976) (17.807) 
      
ENVPERFxENVPROVD 27.646* 33.791** 44.936** 30.100** 46.337** 
 (14.338) (16.645) (20.731) (14.612) (21.877) 
      
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes 
      
N (firm/year) 692 422 242 422 238 
Adj. R2 0.678 0.734 0.729 0.741 0.763 
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PR (dependent variable in all specifications) is the market value of equity six months after fiscal year-end scaled by the 
number of common shares; BVS is the book value of equity scaled by the number of common shares; EPS is the earnings 
before interest and taxation scaled by the number of common shares; LOSS is a binary variable which equals one if EPS is 
negative and zero otherwise; ENVPERF is the environmental performance pillar of ASSET4 (on a % scale) as measured by 
ASSET4 analysts; ENVPROVD is a binary variable which equals one if a firm has recognized environmental provisions in its 
balance sheet in the current year and zero otherwise. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Two-way clustered (by firm and year) standard errors (in parentheses) 
 
 
Table 7. Additional analysis 2: Heckman selection model  
Valuation model  PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^LOSSRS + α_(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αaENVPERFRS + αcENVPROVDRS +
αh(ENVPERFRS × ENVPROVDRS) + ∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
Selection model  ASSET4RS = αV + αXSIZERS + αYLEVRS + α^TOBINQRS + α_BMRS + αaROERS + ∑ αcdINDRS 
efg
dfX +
∑ αhiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS   
Valuation model Coef. SE 
Constant 47.613*** -8.17 
BVS 0.654*** -0.16 
EPS 3.921*** -0.949 
LOSS -1.862 -4.259 
LOSSxEPS -2.509* -1.506 
ENVPERF -16.499** -8.07 
ENVPROVD -35.881*** -11.968 
ENVPERFxENVPROVD 25.509* -14.136 
  
 
Industry effects yes 
Year effects yes 
  
 
Selection model 
 
 
Constant -12.999*** -1.277 
SIZE 0.896*** -0.091 
LEV -0.130*** -0.042 
TOBINQ 0.141*** -0.026 
BM -0.334*** -0.118 
ROE -0.029*** -0.009 
  
 
Industry effects yes 
Year effects yes 
  
 
Likelihood Ratio χ2 4.57** 
n 5,964 
Uncensored 692 
Valuation model PR (dependent variable of the valuation model) is the market value of equity six months after fiscal year-end 
scaled by the number of common shares; BVS is the book value of equity scaled by the number of common shares; EPS is the 
earnings before interest and taxation scaled by the number of common shares; LOSS is a binary variable which equals one if 
EPS is negative and zero otherwise; ENVPERF is the environmental performance pillar of ASSET4 (on a % scale) as measured 
by ASSET4 analysts; ENVPROVD is a binary variable which equals one if a firm has recognized environmental provisions in its 
balance sheet in the current year and zero otherwise. 
Selection model ASSET4 (dependent variable of the selection model) is a binary variable which equals one if the firm is 
covered in ASSET4 and zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is a leverage ratio computed as total 
liabilities divided by book value of equity; TOBINQ is computed as market value of equity divided by total assets; BM is book-
to-market ratio computed as book value of equity to market value of equity; ROE is return on equity ratio computed as 
earnings before interest and taxation to book value of equity. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by firm 
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Table 8. Additional analysis 3: Other specifications 
Model (i)  PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^ENVPERFRS + α_ENVPROVDRS + αa(ENVPERFRS × ENVPROVDRS) + ∑ αcdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αhiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS  
Model (ii)  PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^LOSSRS + α_(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αaENVPERF2RS + αcENVPROVDRS + αh(ENVPERF2RS × ENVPROVDRS) + ∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
Model (iii) PRRS = αV + αXBVSRSuX + αYEPSRSuX + α^LOSSRSuX + α_(LOSSRSuX × EPSRSuX) + αaENVPERFRSuX + αcENVPROVDRSuX + αh(ENVPERFRSuX × ENVPROVDRSuX) + ∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS  
Model (iv)  PRRS = αV + αXBVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^ENVPERFRS + α_ENVPROVDRS + αa(ENVPERFRS × ENVPROVDRS) + αcLOSSRS + αh(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αjSIZERS + αgLEVRS + αXVBMRS + αXXETSRS + αXYSUSTREPRS +
∑ αX^dINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αX_iYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
Model (v) PRRS = αV + αXBV_ENVPROVSRS + αYEPSRS + α^LOSSRS + α_(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αaENVPERFRS + αcENVPROVSRS + αh(ENVPERFRS × ENVPROVSRS) + ∑ αjdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αgiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
Model (vi)  PRRS = αV + αXTASRS + αYTLSRS + α^EPSRS + α_LOSSRS + αa(LOSSRS × EPSRS) + αcENVPERFRS + αhENVPROVDRS + αj(ENVPERFRS × ENVPROVDRS) + ∑ αgdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αXViYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
Model (vii)  TOBINQRS = αV + αXSIZERS + αYROERS + α^LEVRS + α_BMRS + αaETSRS + αcSUSTREPRS + αhENVPERFRS + αjENVPROVDRS + αg(ENVPERFRS × ENVPROVDRS) + ∑ αXVdINDRS 
efg
dfX + ∑ αXXiYRRS 
ifYVX_
ifYVVa + εRS 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
 Profit Making Altern Envir Perf Lagged Variables Additional Variables Env Provisions Balance Sheet Model TobinQ Model 
Constant 44.191*** 32.830*** 43.936*** 41.359* -3.996 44.444*** 3.775*** 
 (8.008) (5.143) (9.655) (23.205) (9.024) (8.954) (0.859) 
        
ENVPERF -13.067 -12.591 -11.635 -6.852 11.480 -11.572 -0.088 
 (8.296) (8.103) (8.195) (8.266) (10.149) (9.643) (0.270) 
        
ENVPROVD -36.050*** -14.842*** -33.323*** -42.640***  -45.105*** -1.108*** 
 (12.871) (3.485) (10.016) (12.766)  (10.518) (0.368) 
        
ENVPERFxENVPROVD 25.790* 27.646* 23.629** 35.196**  39.131*** 0.968** 
 (15.673) (14.333) (11.215) (15.858)  (12.717) (0.448) 
        
ENVPROVS     -15.932**   
     (7.202)   
        
ENVPERFxENVPROVS     17.813**   
     (8.055)   
        
BVS 0.660*** 0.663*** 0.537*** 0.777***    
 (0.209) (0.183) (0.207) (0.170)    
        
BV_ENVPROVS     0.413**   
     (0.203)   
        
TAS      0.563***  
      (0.182)  
        
TLS      -0.642***  
      (0.219)  
        
EPS 3.981*** 3.989*** 3.982*** 3.613*** 3.996*** 4.029***  
 (1.080) (0.991) (0.849) (0.854) (1.208) (0.746)  
        
LOSS  -2.287 -6.452** -0.644 5.784   
  (3.900) (3.193) (3.635) (5.156)   
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LOSSxEPS  -2.673* -4.414** -3.448** -1.863   
  (1.555) (1.927) (1.344) (1.935)   
        
SIZE    0.055   -0.149*** 
    (1.584)   (0.051) 
        
ROE       1.036*** 
       (0.256) 
        
LEV    -0.716   -0.097*** 
    (0.602)   (0.023) 
        
BM    -7.563**   -0.143** 
    (3.858)   (0.072) 
        
ETS    -4.466   0.004 
    (3.223)   (0.080) 
        
SUSTREP    -2.024   -0.018 
    (2.701)   (0.086) 
        
        
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
        
N (firm/year) 641 692 601 692 211 692 692 
Adj. R2 0.666 0.678 0.603 0.713 0.761 0.648 0.510 
PR [dependent variable in all but Model (vii) models] is the market value of equity six months after fiscal year-end scaled by the number of common shares; TOBINQ [dependent variable 
in Model (vii)] is computed as market value of equity divided by total assets; ENVPERF is the environmental performance pillar of ASSET4 (on a % scale) as measured by ASSET4 analysts 
[in Model (ii) ENVPERF is constructed by removing the common variation between ENVPERF and EVPROVD]; ENVPROVD is a binary variable which equals one if a firm has recognized 
environmental provisions in its balance sheet in the current year and zero otherwise; ENVPROVS is the environmental provisions recognized in a firm's balance sheet scaled by the 
number of common shares; BVS is the book value of equity scaled by the number of common shares; BV_ENVPROVS is the book value of equity minus environmental provisions scaled by 
the number of common shares; TAS is total assets scaled by the number of commons shares; TLS is total liabilities scaled by the number of common shares; EPS is the earnings before 
interest and taxation scaled by the number of common shares; LOSS is a binary variable which equals one if EPS is negative and zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets; ROE is return on equity ratio computed as earnings before interest and taxation to book value of equity; LEV is a leverage ratio computed as total liabilities divided by book value of 
equity; BM is book-to-market ratio computed as book value of equity to market value of equity; ETS is a binary variable which equals one if the firm’s emissions are traded in an emissions 
trading scheme and zero otherwise; SUSTREP is a binary variable which equals one if the firm publishes a stand-alone sustainability report in the current year and zero otherwise. 
***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
Two-way clustered (by firm and year) standard errors (in parentheses) 
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Appendix 
 
Variables definitions 
Variables Description   
PR Market value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: MV) six months after fiscal year-end 
scaled by the number of common shares (Datastream  item identifier: WC05301) 
BVS Book value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: WC03995) scaled by the number of 
common shares (Datastream  item identifier: WC05301) 
EPS Earnings before interest and taxation (Datastream  item identifier: WC18191) scaled by 
the number of common shares (Datastream  item identifier: WC05301) 
ENVPROVD Binary variable which equals one if a firm has recognized environmental provisions in 
its balance sheet in the current year and zero otherwise (Asset4 identifier: ENERDP092) 
ENVPROVS Environmental provisions recognized in a firm's balance sheet (Asset4 identifier: 
ENERDP092) scaled by the number of common shares (Datastream  item identifier: 
WC05301) 
  
BV_ENVPROVS Book value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: WC03995) minus environmental 
provisions (Asset4 identifier: ENERDP092) scaled by the number of common shares 
(Datastream  item identifier: WC05301) 
  
ENVPERF Environmental performance (on a % scale) measured by ASSET4 analysts (ASSET4 item 
identifier: ENVSCORE) 
LOSS Binary variable which equals one if EPS is negative and zero otherwise 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets (Datastream  item identifier: WC02999) 
ROE Return on equity ratio computed as earnings before interest and taxation (Datastream  
item identifier: WC18191) to book value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: 
WC03995) 
 
LEV Leverage ratio computed as total liabilities (Datastream  item identifier: WC03351) 
divided by book value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: WC03995) 
BM Book-to-market ratio computed as book value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: 
WC03995) to market value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: MV) 
  
TAS Total assets (Datastream  item identifier: WC02999) scaled by the number of commons 
shares (Datastream  item identifier: WC05301) 
TLS Total liabilities (Datastream  item identifier: WC03351) scaled by the number of 
common shares (Datastream  item identifier: WC05301) 
TOBINQ Tobin’s Q computed as market value of equity (Datastream  item identifier: MV) divided 
by total assets (Datastream  item identifier: WC02999) 
ETS Binary variable which equals one if the firm’s emissions are traded in an emissions 
trading scheme and zero otherwise (Asset4 identifier: ENERDP068) 
SUSTREP Binary variable which equals one if the firm publishes a stand-alone sustainability 
report in the current year and zero otherwise (Asset4 identifier: CGVSDP026) 
YR Multiple dummy variable based on the ten years under examination 
IND Multiple dummy variable based on the nine out of the ten industries of the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (Datastream  item identifier: ICBIC) 
  
All variables are based on data extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream and Thomson Reuters ASSET4  
 
 
